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Summary. - The paper argues that policy conclusions derived from existing theories of 
economic development may be seriously flawed because the theories do not model correctly the 
modem-sector labor market. The paper first presents evidence that trade unions and 
governments frequently exert positive influence not only on firms’ wages but also on their 
employment levels. It then presents models that capture this phenomenon and permit one to 
determine whether the observed levels of employment are insufficient, optimal, or excessive 
from the private and social standpoints. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the 
analysis could be implemented in empirical studies and in practical policy work. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
While the issues of structural adjustment have 
recently been the focus of public policy in many 
developing countries, the labor market aspects of 
these issues have been treated in an ad hoc and 
elementary fashion. Indeed, the policies of the 
World Bank in the 1980s have been geared 
primarily toward export growth, trade liberaliza- 
tion, decentralized restructuring of industries 
(sectors), and resource allocation based on 
scarcity-reflecting prices. Within the labor 
market, the World Bank policy has been one of 
noninvolvement or of arguing the case for lower 
wage increases in the modem sector and the 
elimination of redundant labor in specific enter- 
prises. Similarly, apart from assisting in various 
legislative initiatives, the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has not pursued a well- 
defined labor market strategy since its World 
Employment Program withered away in the 
1970s. 
This paper builds on institutional insights from 
a number of developing countries to provide a 
framework for evaluating the allocative per- 
formance of their modern-sector labor markets. 
A careful analysis of the modern-sector labor 
market is useful because this market is frequently 
subject to heavy regulation. As a result, its 
institutions are often important and inefficiencies 
can in principle be substantial. 
In the next section we examine the main labor 
market models used for analyzing developing 
economies. Section 3 presents institutional evi- 
dence which contradicts the basic assumptions of 
these models, while Section 4 outlines a theore- 
tical framework which takes this evidence into 
account and allows for empirical testing of the 
various models. Section 5 briefly discusses em- 
pirical and policy implications. 
2. ISSUES OF ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
The basic question that needs to be answered 
before one can formulate a meaningful labor 
market policy is how are wages (labor cost) and 
employment set. It is fair to say that wage and 
employment determination in the modern sector 
of developing countries is one of the least 
understood areas of development economics. 
The traditional approach is to assume that 
institutional forces (the government or trade 
unions) somehow set the modem-sector wage 
above its counterpart(s) in the rest of the 
economy. Since the traditional concept of alloca- 
tive efficiency requires that, except for compen- 
sating differentials, the wage paid to a common 
labor type be equalized across uses, the 
“abstract” institutional forces are the prime 
causes of allocative inefficiencies. 
Arthur Lewis (1954), for instance, postulated 
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that modem-sector wages are somehow set 
higher than the average income in the traditional 
sector (e.g., 20-30% higher) and claimed not to 
know how these wages are set. Since labor 
availability at the institutionally set wage, rather 
than its determination, was crucial to the models 
in the 1950s and 1960s Lewis (1954), Ranis and 
Fei (1961) and Jorgenson (1964) never spun off 
an analytical literature that would examine the 
wage setting process and/or outcome. 
The Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro 
(1970) papers marked the next generation of 
theoretical models, and their extensions have 
dominated the labor market literature on less 
developed countries (LDCs) to date. They have 
advanced the conceptual framework by stressing 
that expectations of variables such as wages, 
rather than their actual realizations, motivate 
workers and determine intersectoral migration of 
labor. Yet, the basic assumption of these models 
is again that the modem-sector (urban) wage is 
somehow set too high - a phenomenon that 
yields their predictions about migration, un- 
employment and relative labor use across 
sectors. These models hence say little about how 
the modern-sector wages are set. Moreover, 
instead of searching for policy solutions in the 
labor market, the vast literature has searched for 
other ways to address the problem of inefficient 
resource allocation - mostly through public 
finance (taxes and subsidies) or quantity ration- 
ing (limits on migration, etc.). Paradoxically, 
within the modern-sector labor market per se, the 
literature invokes the simple traditional model 
which fully dictates the conclusions about alloca- 
tive efficiency. ’
In particular, the labor market framework 
which is used in the development literature 
assumes that the wage-employment outcome 
aiways lies on the marginal revenue product 
curve of labor RL and that, in the absence of 
institutional factors, the economy would be 
characterized by full employment and a single 
market clearing wage WC for all workers of a 
given skill. The modem-sector institutions (e.g., 
the trade unions or the Ministry of Labor) are 
then seen as either unilaterally setting the 
modem-sector wage W, above the competitive 
level (W, > WC), or as achieving this result by 
bargaining with employers. The crucial implicit 
assumption which drives the results of this model 
is that either these institutions try to raise wages 
but do not care about employment, or that the 
employer has complete power to adjust employ- 
ment unilaterally so as to maximize profit or 
minimize cost. As Figure 1 shows, the outcome is 
a situation where the modern-sector wage 
exceeds its competitive counterpart (wirM > WC) 
and employment in the modern sector i falls 
short of the competitive level L’, which is 
characterized by the equality of the marginal 
revenue product of labor RL and WC. Allocative 
inefficiency results because RL > WC in the 
modem sector and the wage elsewhere W, is 
depressed below the competitive level (We < WC) 
due to the spillover of L*- L workers from the 
modem into the traditional sector. 




developing economies attempt to explain the 
high modem-sector wage endogenously in terms 
of a profit-maximizing employer responding to a 
labor turnover cost2 or to a positive wage-labor 
productivity nexus (the efficiency wage hypo- 
thesis).3 In these models, the modem-sector 
wage is set unilaterally by the employer, with the 
unions or government playing no role. The 
prediction of the efficiency wage model is that 
the marginal revenue product of (the efficiency 
unit of) labor equals the wage (per efficiency 
unit), while in the labor turnover model the wage 
actually falls short of the labor’s marginal 
revenue product. The efficiency wage model is 
hence traditional in that it equates labor’s cost 
with its marginal product, while the labor tum- 
over model is nontraditional in that the employer 
selects a wage-employment pair which lies to the 
left of the marginal revenue product curve of 
labor (point B” in Figure 1). 
The main thesis of this paper is that the 
assumptions that (a) employers can unilaterally 
set employment and/or (b) trade unions or 
governments do not influence positively the level 
of modem-sector employment is a serious mis- 
representation of the situation in many develop- 
ing countries. In particular, it is claimed that the 
theoretical prediction, derived from a model 
based on the institutional frameworks of many 
developing countries, implies that the wage- 
employment outcome lies to the right of the 
marginal revenue product curve of labor (points 
C-F in Figure 1). The next section describes 
some of the relevant institutional features in a 
number of developing countries. 
3. SOME INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
An examination of legal regulations and the 
actual wage and employment setting practices in 
the labor markets of developing countries shows 
that the government and trade unions frequently 
influence not only wages but also employment 
levels. A related observation is that managers 
often report that regulations and social pressure 
induce them to maintain employment at levels 
which are excessive from the standpoint of 
enterprise profitability. Relatively systematic 
evidence on this issue now exists with respect to 
public or parapublic enterprises. Information is 
less readily available for private firms, although 
for several countries it is possible to show that 
private firms have been significantly affected as 
well. 
(a) Public enterprises 
The public sector frequently accounts for 3O- 
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60% of modem-sector employment, and in 
some countries it also serves as the wage setter. 
The laws often permit unionization in public 
enterprises and both the unions and governments 
have been under social pressure to increase 
employment in the presence of open and dis- 
guised unemployment. The issue of feather- 
bedding in (para) public enterprises has become 
a focal point of virtually all structural adjustment 
exercises and a growing literature has highlighted 
the idea that (para) public enterprise emolov- 
ment usually exceeds the point of equaliiy 
between labor’s marginal product and wage.4 
(b) Private sector 
Labor legislation enacted in many countries 
also ensures that wages and labor utilization are 
both subject to collective bargaining and the 
government has in some cases entered the in- 
dustrial relations arena as a third (social) partner. 
The Francophone West African countries 
have, for instance, based their labor legislation 
on the 1952 French Overseas Labor Code, and 
many of them set strict limits on the employer’s 
ability to adjust wages and employment uni- 
laterally. The Senegalese Labor Code is known 
to be one of the most restrictive ones and it 
literally reduces managerial discretion in the. 
labor market to a minimum.5 In English- 
speaking African countries, one also finds 
numerous examples of government intervention. 
For instance, the three Kenyan tripartite agree- 
ments have aimed at increasing employment 
beyond the levels desired by employers and at 
least the last (1978) agreement (a presidential 
directive to increase employment by 10%) 
reportedly did have a significant effect.6 
Latin American evidence also points to 
examples of effective government intervention in 
the labor market. Spinanger’s (1984) study of the 
Panamanian labor market, for instance, indicates 
that since 1972 it has been subject to very strict 
regulations. In fact, the 1972 Panamanian Labor 
Code contains over 1,000 provisions which 
minutely lay down the rights and obligations of 
employers and employees, and which are en- 
forced by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Welfare. 
As the above examples indicate, the institu- 
tional evidence suggests that in many labor 
markets both wages and employment are set 
jointly by employers, trade unions and often also 
the government. The possible allocative implica- 
tions of this process are examined next. 
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4. “MODERN” MODELS OF THE LABOR 
MARKET 
The models that take into account the possi- 
bility of a joint determination of employment and 
wages by the bargainers originate with Leontief s 
(1946) seminal piece. They were further 
developed by Fellner (1947) and Cartter (1959) 
and they received considerable attention in the 
198os.8 
In terms of Figure 1, these models consider the 
zone of bargaining which lies anywhere between 
the threat points of the bargainers rather than 
just on the marginal revenue product curve of 
labor RL. In particular, let the trade union and/ 
or government be one bargainer whose threat 
point is the competitive (market clearing) wage 
W,.9 The employer is the other party and his 
threat point can be identified with some mini- 
mum level of profit, say JC = 0. In Figure 1 the 
bargaining range hence covers the area between 
the horizontal line W, and the concave isoprofit 
curve n = 0. 
The maximum profit that the employer can 
obtain corresponds to the isoprofit curve n = 
Max in Figure 1. Since W, is the lowest accept- 
able wage to the unions and/or government, 
point A is the only feasible point corresponding 
to rc = Max. The corresponding employment 
level L* is socially efficient as RL = W, at A and 
one cannot increase the economy’s output by 
moving a worker from one job to another. 
In an ideal, long-run world the competitive 
forces depress the isoprofit curve n = 0 to the 
level of n = Max (x = 0 = Max) and the 
bargaining range collapses into point A. In that 
world, all firms operate at A in the long run or go 
under. In reality, one observes bargaining even 
in the relatively competitive, more developed 
countries. The bargaining range hence exists and 
is brought about by either lack of competition or 
firm-specific (e.g., human capital) rents. Given 
that one may safely assume that such a range 
exists in many industries of the developing 
countries, the relevant question is what the wage- 
employment combination in a given industrial 
labor market looks like. 
(a) The trade unions care only about wages 
In this case, the union objective function U is 
an increasing function of W, U = U (IV), with U 
> 0. The indifference curves corresponding to U 
would be horizontal lines and the points of 
tangency between these indifference curves and 
the employer’s isoprofit curves would trace out 
the contract curve ABB’ in Figure 1. While 
outcomes along this contract curve are Pareto 
efficient from the private standpoint of the 
bargainers, except for A they are all socially 
inefficient since RL > WC and total product 
could hence be increased if labor were reallo- 
cated into this sector. 
An outcome of this kind could, for instance, 
arise if layoffs were instituted in the inverse 
order of seniority and the unions were controlled 
by senior workers who did not face any personal 
danger of layoffs. This “elite union model” hence 
gives the same results as the traditional model of 
the labor market used in the development 
literature. 
(b) The unions andlorgovernment care about 
both wages and employment 
In this case, the union-government objective 
function is of the form U = U(W,L), with Uw, 
U, > 0, and ULL, lJm < 0. Such a function 
could correspond to a case where greater em- 
ployment is directly yielding utility to the policy 
makers. Alternatively, if the pool i of workers 
“represented” by the. union (government) is 
larger than the number employed (L > L), then 
a utility function U = U(W) yields an expected 
utility function of the form U = U(W,L). 
Scenario (b) can then be viewed as one of 
expected utility maximization by the union. 
The indifference curves corresponding to U = 
U(W,L) are downward sloping an convex in the 
(W,L) plane in Figure 1. Since the isoprofit 
curves are concave and downward sloping to the 
right of the marginal revenue product curve of 
labor RL, the contract curve (points of tangency 
between the indifference curves and the isoprofit 
curves) lies to the right of the RL curve. Contract 
curves ACC’, ADD’, and AEE’ represent 
various cases that may arise in this context. 
For any given division rule, contract curve 
ACC’ generates a lower wage and higher em- 
ployment than curve ABB’ of scenario (a). 
Nevertheless, resource allocation is still ineffi- 
cient along ACC’ and RL > W, everywhere 
except at A. 
Contract curve ADD’ represents the “socially 
efficient” contract. lo Resources are allocated in a 
socially efficient way everywhere along ADD’ 
(RL = W,) and the union-government interven- 
tion in the labor market is a purely distributive 
exercise determining how the rent (profit) is 
split. Within the expected utility framework, 
contract curve ADD’ corresponds to risk neu- 
trality (expected income maximization) on the 
part of the union-government party.” However, 
within a dynamic framework the social efficiency 
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result may have to be modified if the two parties 
have different savings (investment) propensities 
and different divisions of the rent hence yield 
different growth paths. 
Contract curve AEE’ is socially inefficient 
because, for W, > W,, it generates too much 
employment in the modem sector. In this case, 
the marginal revenue product of labor falls short 
of not only W, (RL < W,) but also W, (RL < 
W,). Within the expected utility framework, 
contract curve AEE’ corresponds to risk aversion 
in the absence of an insurance (compensation) 
scheme for the i-L workers. Within the utility 
framework it constitutes the case of relatively 
high marginal utility of employment. Contract 
curve AEE’, for instance, provides an appro- 
priate characterization of those (para) public 
enterprises that are seen as having excessive 
employment and paying above market wages. 
(c) The government cares only about employment 
The utility function in this scenario is U = 
U(L), with U’ > 0. The corresponding indif- 
ference map is composed of vertical curves and 
the contract curve is the horizontal line AFF in 
Figure 1. The inefficiency of this contract curve is 
similar to but more pronounced than that of 
AEE’. This case is clearly extreme, but it 
captures well the situation in public enterprises 
or civil service units that do not pay high wages 
and suffer from an extremely low or negative 
marginal product of labor. To the extent that the 
solution actually lies to the right of point F’ in 
Figure 1, one observes a (public) enterprise 
where the emphasis on employment creation has 
been extreme and subsidies are required to keep 
the firm in business. 
5. EMPIRICAL AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS 
Scenarios (a) and (c) are of course special 
(nested) cases of scenario (b), which in turn 
conceptually spans all the aforementioned labor 
market models except for the labor turnover one, 
where W,+, < RL. The latter can, however, be 
easily incorporated into a common hypothesis 
testing framework. Empirically, the issue of 
allocative efficiency in the modem sector can, 
therefore, be treated as one of a set of nested 
hypotheses. An examination of the nature of 
allocative inefficiencies and hence a test of the 
various models can be performed within a simple 
two- or three-narty optimization framework with 
data on employment, output, prices, WM and 
W,. A test of the corresponding distributive rules 
requires, in addition, data on profit (rent).” 
Interestingly, a recent test of allocative behavior 
of Tunisian public and private firms, performed 
within the above framework, suggests that the 
two sets of firms behave similarly and select 
outcomes between contact curves ABB’ and 
ADD’ .I3 
In policy-oriented field work, the ability to 
distinguish between cases ABB’ or ACC’ on the 
one hand and AEE’ or AFF’ on the other hand is 
of course crucial. Yet, note that using the usual 
source of information, namely the claim of 
managers or bankers that wages and employment 
are too high, is not a valid approach. While such 
a claim is correct from a profit-maximizing 
standpoint of the firm (i.e., indicating that the 
outcome is to the right of ABB’ in Figure l), 
it does not constitute a valid proof that employ- 
ment is too large from the social standpoint (i.e., 
corresponding to an outcome such as AEE’ or 
AFF’). The claim is consistent with an outcome 
on a curve such as ACC’ which warrants an 
increase of modem-sector employment from the 
social standpoint. 
Rather than relying solely on claims of various 
parties, it is preferable to undertake comparisons 
of the marginal revenue product of labor with 
zero and W,, respectively. The first comparison 
(RL 5 0) is relatively easy and in the case RL 
< 0 it is very informative.i4 The second com- 
parison is more difficult, since W, is generally 
unobserved because of all the existing distor- 
tions. Nevertheless, since for any given skill W, is 
a weighted average of wages (incomes) in the 
various sectors, a usable estimate of W, could in 
many cases be constructed. 
The policy prescription then derives directly 
from whether RL 5 W,. The fact that W, is 
or is not greater than W, is in many respects 
irrelevant. 
A final point that is worth making with respect 
to the policy use of these types of models in 
developing countries is that the Harris and 
Todaro-type unemployment problem may exist 
even if RL < W, in the modern sector. In 
particular, so long as W, exceeds workers’ 
compensation in other sectors, there may be an 
incentive for workers from these other sectors to 
look for modem-sector jobs. The level of W, 
(and, depending on the bargaining process, also 
W,) reflects and directly affects this activity, but 
it does not prevent its existence. In particular, if 
the economy is characterized by on-the-job 
search, then the welfare implications discussed in 
this paper are valid. However, if workers become 
unemployed in order to look for modern-sector 
jobs, then welfare losses may result, even if RL s 
W, in the modern sector. 
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NOTES 
1. Calvo’s (1978) model is a notable exception. 
2. See, e.g., Stiglitz (1974). 
3. See, e.g., Mirrlees (1975), Rodgers (1975) 
Stiglitz (1976), and Bliss and Stem (1978). 
4. See, e.g., Collier (1986) and Macedo (1986) for 
recent evidence with respect to these public enterprise 
issues in Nigeria and Brazil respectively, and Ayub and 
Hegstad (1986) for evidence on public enterprises 
in, e.g., Ghana, India, Tunisia, Zambia, Israel and 
Mexico. Galenson and Terre11 (1988) provide evidence 
on transport (railway, port, airline, and bus) enter- 
prises in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
5. The three main actors on the Senegalese labor 
scene are the government (Ministry of Public Affairs & 
Labor), the cooperating trade union federation 
(CNTS), and the employers’ association (CNES). 
These three “social partners” form the so-called Tripar- 
tite Commission which determines the rate of increase 
in basic wages of various professional (skill) categories. 
An “Extension Decree” effectively guarantees that the 
government extends the terms of the accords of the 
Tripartite Commission to other sectors as well. 
Governmental policies and regulations also control 
hiring, employment contracts, layoffs, and hours of 
work. In particular, weekly hours of work are set by the 
Labor Code and cannot be altered unilaterally by 
employers. The government also exercises monopoly 
control over the hiring of workers by enterprises, 
ensures that permanent contract is the principal form 
of employment relationship, and it carefully scrutinizes 
(and often turns down) employer requests for a 
permission to lay off workers. The stated position of 
the entrepreneurs is that the system too often leads to a 
prohibition of layoffs when they are needed for the 
survival and efficient functioning of the firm. See 
Terrell and Svejnar (1989) for a more detailed descrip- 
tion of the Senegalese system. 
6. See, e.g., Fallon (1986). 
7. From the standpoint of this paper, the most 
important areas covered by the Panamanian Labor 
Code are job security (no discretionary layoffs), hours 
of work, minimum and contractually set wages, the 
formation of trade unions, and collective bargaining. 
Spinanger’s (1984) survey of 54 Panamanian firms 
subject to the legislation inter oliu indicates that 
relatively few felt they would be able to adjust 
employment in response to a ceterti paribus minimum 
wage increase. Indeed, 75% of the firms indicated that 
a 10% increase in the minimum wage would result in no 
change in their employment levels. When confronted 
with a hypothetical 50% minimum wage increase, one- 
third of the firms still indicated that employment would 
not be adjusted, while one-third stated that they would 
be forced out of business. The majority of the firms also 
identified the constraints on hiring and firing as the 
most problematic feature of the Labor Code. 
8. See, for instance, Aoki (1980, 1982), McDonald 
and Solow (1981), Svejnar (1982, 1986), Miyazaki 
(1984), MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) and Brown and 
Ashenfelter (1986). 
9. The interpretation and identification of W, is not 
always simple. An alternative interpretation of WC is 
that it represents a summary of alternative wages which 
the modem sector workers can obtain with different 
probabilities. In this second interpretation, WC may not 
equal the market clearing (competitive) wage and some 
of the conclusions of this paper would have to be 
modified. 
10. This is the outcome analyzed in the Harris-Todaro 
framework by Calvo (1978). 
11. See Svejnar (1982). 
12. See, e.g., McDonald and Solow (1981) and 
Svejnar (1986). 
13. See Svejnar and Hariga (1988). 
14. This might be the case for instance in Mauritius 
and Argentine ports as well as Costa Rican and 
Pakistani railways, where it is estimated that over 80% 
of the workforce is redundant. See Galenson and 
Terre11 (1988). 
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